Causation in Memory CFP 

Special issue of Philosophical Psychology 

Editors:

Nikola Andonovski (Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes)

Kourken Michaelian (Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes)

Sarah Robins (Purdue University)

Debates about causation have been at center stage in recent philosophy of memory. On the long-dominant causal theory, memory requires an appropriate causal connection to a past experience, sustained by a memory trace. Recent developments have posed a number of challenges to this received view. New empirical work has raised doubts about the prominence, and even existence, of discrete memory traces. Evidence about the varieties of reconstruction in memory has deepened the suspicion that such traces cannot sustain appropriate causal chains to the past. Even more prominently, the discovery of a close neural connection has led some theorists to re-characterize remembering as a kind of imaginative simulation, a process that does not require a causal link to a specific past experience. Reinvigorating the philosophical study of memory, these developments have raised significant questions about the nature and varieties of causation in memory.

The aim of this special issue is to draw attention to these questions and to bring together researchers examining conceptual and empirical issues pertaining to causation in memory. Questions addressed can include but are not limited to:

Invited contributors include:

Submission instructions:

The editors will evaluate manuscripts before sending them for external peer review. Only the manuscripts judged as suitable for publication by two independent reviewers will be accepted for publication.